- Fred’s euthanasia was a carfeul consideration of danger to the public and mitigating factors
Understanding why the new protocol is an improvement
Before the current protocol was compiled, a management policy (Brownlie 2000) for raiding baboons was already in place. This policy was devised by the authorities in conjunction with civic, scientific (Kansky & Gaynor) and NGO (Baboon Matters and KEAG) input. This policy allowed for euthanasia when a baboon was deemed to be “potentially dangerous to public health and safety in spite of management changes to rectify the perceived threat”. However the policy made no demand for quantitative data relevant to that raiding animal. Further, it was not even necessary to reliably identify the offending animal. Thus, it was possible to euthanize a baboon without providing very much information about the animal, its raiding behaviour, the potential impacts of that raiding on other baboons nor the relevant mitigating factors that may have led to the behaviour (e.g. drought, lack of monitors).
The new protocol demands that qualitative and quantitative data are provided to the Baboon Conservation Authorities (BCA) and Wildlife Advisory Committee (WAC) before any decisions are made. That is, a case history of raiding must be compiled, i.e. raiding type (e.g. bins, houses, people), raiding frequency and the potential impacts of that raiding on other baboons must be assessed. Furthermore, it implicitly addresses ‘potential’ mitigating factors. Thus, if the raiding occurred only during a drought period or after an extensive fire then the raiding must be evaluated within this context. It does not imply that if there is any one mitigating factor that is satisfied that the baboon will not be euthanized. This last point is often misunderstood. Essentially, the BCA and WAC have to apply their minds to the ‘raiding behaviour’ on the one side and the ‘mitigating factors’ on the other. They have to weigh up the evidence on both sides and then make a final decision based on their collective experience and expertise in wildlife management. An essential part of this decision making is that none of the WAC committee members are affected by baboon raiding on the Peninsula and thus their decision is impartial and based on the evidence at hand.
Thus, there is no one single category that either results in a baboon being euthanized (e.g. enter cars with people) or prevents it from being euthanized (e.g. alpha male status). Rather the weight of evidence for and against euthanasia is assessed in its entirety. This approach has saved the lives of many baboons that are known to be serial raiders that pose a risk to human health and safety. Of late, the euthanasia of Fred, a male from the Smits troop has received much press coverage and his case serves as an illustration of how the new protocol was applied.
Fred in the context of the protocol
Euthanasia was first considered for Fred in 2010 – his behaviour posed a clear risk to human health and safety. However, the considerable weight of mitigating factors, including alpha status, absence of monitors, inadequate education, lack of baboon proofing of municipal and residential waste negated euthanasia. The protocol illustrated inadequate baboon management in the area. Thus, monitors were introduced. In the meantime, Fred lost his undisputed alpha male status; being deposed twice in the previous year and receiving routine challenges by two of the troop’s other males. In addition, a large education drive had been completed in 2010 including many hours of civic involvement (BLG and BRU members). New signage, pamphlets in multiple languages and warning flags were distributed along the Smits road (where chronic raiding occurs). Thus from 2010 to 2011, baboon management improved substantially. However, Fred’s behavior continued to worsen as he attacked people more frequently, with more aggression – people submitted affidavits testifying to physical injury inflicted by Fred and children suffering emotional trauma as a result of car raids, received counseling. Fred also began to raid in solitary, when the troop was with new males. Lastly, Fred had resorted to attacking monitors, ECO’s and authorities attempting to intervene during his raids (i.e. closing car doors or preventing him from approaching cars).
In the context of the protocol, the weight of the mitigating factors had lessened substantially, and the risk to the health and safety of people as a result of Fred’s behaviour had increased. The balance had swung from a situation that required mitigation to one that required intervention. Yes, municipal and residential waste had not been baboon proofed but the authorities recognized that car raiding was spatially disconnected from bin raiding – baboon-proof waste areas would do nothing to limit car raiding*. At the time of Fred’s review, by WAC in 2011, neither the authorities, nor the BLG nor BRU had a solution to avert Fred’s raiding. Thus, in the face of all the evidence and data collected, the decision to euthanize Fred, although highly undesirable, was balanced and objective. There was no way the authorities could guarantee the safety of a law abiding citizen on this section of road. The law is clear on the rights of the public and it is patently clear that failure by the authorities to address a confirmed source of danger to the public would have been a serious dereliction of duty. Sadly, much of the press coverage sensationalized this process, causing unjustified and uninformed opposition and wide criticism of a very thorough and careful deliberation process.
*Currently the authorities are working in conjunction with the BLG to improve waste management in the area, pro-actively preventing additional bin-raiding behaviour.
The mitigating factors (mentioned above) continue to be addressed and improved and while long-term solutions have been proposed, including ‘gateways to Smits’, ‘not letting the public stop along the road’ etc., none of these can be implemented overnight and require a lengthy process of public participation, permission from a host of authorities (e.g., roads department) and funding which may take up to two years or more. This would not have been in time to alter Fred’s behaviour. Everyone involved in any way with baboons in Cape Town, even those that passively followed stories in the press, knew about Fred and his dangerous behaviour. Of all those people, no-one was able to provide a workable, sustainable solution or funding (Baboon Matters included) prior to his death. Some possible solutions were proffered by members of the public after his death but all of these were already part of long term solutions that are being worked on by the BLG, BRU and the BCA. An example of one of these solutions is the ‘baboon protectors’ devised by the BLG with input from BRU. These protectors are charged with interfacing with the public and informing motorists on the Smits road about the dangers of car-raiding baboons. This solution was thanks to a private donation (funds are a limiting resource for all involved with baboon management). This intervention is being managed by the Nature Conservation Corporation (NCC). It is our hope that this will further prevent other baboons (who are less bold than Fred and defer to monitors) in this troop from following in Fred’s fatal footsteps. We have witnessed significant improvements to management of the Smits troop including monitors for the first time in the troop’s history and the best education drive of all Peninsula troops yet performed.
As zoologists, we do not like to see a wild animal killed because of the errors of the public (feeding from cars) but certainly do understand the decision-making of the authorities given the evidence on hand and having witnessed Fred’s attacks escalating in aggression. There is not a wildlife conservation organization in the world that does not have to grapple with so-called problem animals and all have their protocols for dealing with such animals. Few are as patient or meticulous as the BCA and WAC at gathering the necessary evidence and this is indeed laudable and worthy of encouragement. There are few instances where such consideration of euthanasia is given by so many authorities; animals are often killed with no consideration at all (e.g. the meat industry) and we encourage all those opposed to euthanasia to address these areas before criticizing the BCA and WAC. For those who consider translocation an option, please refer to the article on translocation in our blog. Lastly, to those who consider sanctuaries an option, we urge them to grapple with the recent challenges faced by the Barrydale baboon sanctuary that have had to euthanize a number of baboons of late.
In conclusion, the new raiding and dispersal protocols are a significant improvement on the previous management strategy which allowed for euthanasia of baboons without placing those decisions in context of the environment in which raiding and dispersal occurs and thus provided no implicit guidelines to prevent any future similar raiding events. Please refer to other articles in our blog for a detailed discussion on ‘what was’ and ‘what is’ with respect to protocols. If the current protocols are stopped then the BCA and WAC will have to revert to the previous approved strategy in which case it will be possible to euthanize any dispersing male that ‘enters the urban edge three times’ or any baboon that is perceived to pose ‘a risk to health and safety’ with absolutely no need to reliably identify the baboon, quantify the raiding behaviour or implicitly consider the mitigating factors involved. We doubt that this is what baboon activists and welfare organizations wish to see and thus urge you to apply your minds to the previous and current status quo and if you think there are ways to improve the protocols or current management to communicate this to your BLG representative.
